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Introduction	  
Pension	   schemes	   can	   be	   classified	   along	   various	   dimensions,	   one	   of	  which	   is	  
their	  degree	  of	  funding	  (Lindbeck	  and	  Persson	  2003,	  Valdés-­‐Prìeto	  2006)	  -­‐	  that	   is	  the	  
ratio	  k	  between	  the	  value	  of	  the	  reserve	  fund	  and	  the	  liabilities	  towards	  the	  members.	  
Along	  such	  a	  dimension,	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  (PAYG)	  schemes	  and	  fully	  funded	  (FF)	  schemes	  
can	  be	  represented	  as	  the	  two	  extremes	  of	  the	  [0-­‐1]	  real	  interval.	  	  
For	   the	   schemes	   where	   k>0,	   the	   return	   on	   the	   reserve	   fund	   represents	   a	  
second	  source	  of	  revenue	  that	  can	  be	  used	  either	  to	  pay	  more	  generous	  pensions	  than	  
the	  contribution	  revenue	  would	  allow	  or	  to	  increase	  the	  fund	  itself.	  	  
It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  Defined-­‐Contribution	  (DC)	  schemes	  provide	  all	  individuals	  
with	  a	  personal,	  interest-­‐bearing	  account	  that	  registers	  all	  individual	  contributions	  paid	  
in	  during	  active	   life.	  At	   retirement,	   the	  balance	  of	   the	  account	   is	   transformed	   into	  a	  
financially	  equivalent	  stream	  of	  pension	  annuities	  according	  to	  the	   life	  expectancy	  of	  
the	  individual’s	  cohort.	  Contrary	  to	  what	  happens	  in	  defined-­‐benefit	  schemes,	  wherein	  
the	   contribution	   rate	   is	   the	   key	   variable	   ensuring	   their	   financial	   stability,	   the	  
sustainability	  of	  defined-­‐contribution	  schemes	  is	  ensured	  by	  the	  appropriate	  choice	  of	  
the	  rate	  of	  return	  yearly	  credited	  on	  all	  account	  balances.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  note	  is	  to	  identify	  a	  notion	  of	  sustainable	  rate	  of	  return,	  which	  is	  
sufficiently	  general	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  whatever	  DC	  scheme,	  regardless	  of	  its	  degree	  of	  
funding.	   In	   particular,	   for	   a	   DC	   pension	   scheme	  whose	   degree	   of	   funding	   in	   a	   given	  
period	  of	  time	  coincides	  with	  its	  desired	  level,	  financial	  sustainability	  obtains	  when	  the	  
flows	  of	  yearly	  contributions	  and	  interests	  accruing	  to	  the	  fund	  allow	  both	  to	  finance	  
the	  disbursement	  for	  pensions	  and	  to	  let	  assets	  grow	  in	  line	  with	  liabilities,	  so	  that	  the	  
degree	  of	  funding	  remains	  at	  its	  desired	  level.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  
a	  stationary	  state	  in	  which	  the	  age	  structure	  of	  the	  population	  and	  the	  growth	  rates	  of	  
the	  new	  plan	  members	  and	  of	  the	  average	  earnings	  are	  constant	  through	  time	  1	  
For	   PAYG	   DC	   schemes,	   whose	   degree	   of	   funding	   is	   nil,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	  
(Samuelson	   1958,	   Aaron	   1966,	   Valdés-­‐Prieto	   2000,	   Gronchi	   and	   Nisticò	   2006,	   2008)	  
that	   the	  sustainable	  rate	  of	   return	  to	  be	  credited	  on	  all	  pension	  accounts	   is	  equal	   to	  
the	  growth	  rate	  of	  the	  total	  earnings	  of	  the	  active	  members.2	  In	  fact,	  this	  rate	  of	  return	  
ensures	   that	   the	   contribution	   revenue	   exactly	   matches	   the	   pension	   expenditure	   in	  
each	   year,	   thus	  ensuring	   also	   that	   the	   system	   remains	  purely	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go,	  namely	  
that	  its	  degree	  of	  funding	  does	  not	  become	  either	  negative	  or	  positive.	  
When	   the	   DC	   scheme	   is	   endowed	   with	   a	   reserve	   fund,	   whose	   management	  
yields	   the	  market	   interest	   rate,	   those	   interests	   should	  be	   taken	   into	  account	   for	   the	  
identification	  of	  the	  sustainable	  rate	  of	  return.	  A	  general	  rule	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  
the	  sustainable	  rate	  of	  return	  for	  the	  DC	  schemes	  with	  a	  positive	  degree	  of	  funding	  can	  
be	  developed	  starting	  from	  the	  consideration	  that,	  in	  a	  stationary	  state,	  the	  liabilities	  
of	  the	  scheme	  grow,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  of	  the	  total	  earnings	  of	  the	  active	  
population.	  Therefore,	   if	  one	  wants	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  funding	  remains	  constant,	  the	  
value	  of	  the	  fund	  must	  also	  grow	  at	  that	  rate,	  which	  requires	  that	  an	  appropriate	  share	  
of	   the	   interests	   be	   yearly	   ‘allocated’	   for	   that	  purpose;	   and	  only	   the	   remaining	   share	  
can	  be	   ‘promised’	   to	  the	  members	  and	  credited	  on	  their	  accounts.	  More	  specifically,	  
the	  flow	  of	  interests	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  ‘correct’	  the	  sustainable	  rate	  of	  return	  of	  pure	  
PAYG	   schemes	   is	   equal	   to	   the	   difference	   (either	   positive	   or	   negative)	   between	   the	  
market	   interest	   rate	   and	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	   the	   total	   earnings	   of	   active	   population	  
times	   the	   value	  of	   the	   fund;	   and,	   consequently,	   the	   extra	   rate	  of	   return	   (positive	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  As	  it	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  Swedish	  pension	  system	  has	  developed	  an	  accounting	  mechanism	  that	  
monitors	   each	   year	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   the	   conventional	   rate	   of	   return	   according	   to	   the	   yearly	  
contribution	  flow	  and	  the	  age	  structure	  of	  the	  insured	  population.	  See	  Settergren	  and	  Mikula	  (2006).	  
2	  The	  proof	  in	  Gronchi	  and	  Nisticò	  (2006	  and	  2008)	  is	  given	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  four-­‐overlapping	  
generations	  model	  and	  it	  is	  unique	  in	  removing	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  constant	  growth	  rate	  of	  wages.	  	  
negative),	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  sustainable	  rate	  of	  pure	  PAYG	  systems,	  is	  equal	  to	  such	  a	  
flow	  divided	  by	  the	  value	  of	  the	  liabilities	  that,	  in	  a	  steady	  state	  with	  constant	  mortality	  
patterns,	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  members’	  account	  balances.	  
In	  fact,	  one	  can	  prove	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  following	  
PROPOSITION:	  
If	  a	  DC	  scheme	  aims	  to	  maintain	  its	  degree	  of	  funding	  unaltered	  through	  time,	  
it	  must	  credit	  on	  all	  account	  balances	  a	  rate	  of	  return	  equal	  to	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  total	  
earnings	  plus	   a	   share,	   equal	   to	   its	   degree	  of	   funding,	   of	   the	  difference	  between	   the	  
market	   interest	   rate	   earned	   by	   the	   fund	   manager	   and	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	   total	  
earnings.	  
PROOF	  
The	   proof	   can	   be	   given	   with	   reference	   to	   a	   very	   simple	  
two-­‐overlapping-­‐generations	   model	   representing	   a	   hypothetical	   DC	   pension	   scheme	  
that,	  when	  started,	  saves	  in	  a	  fund	  a	  share	   k 	  (with	   ≤ ≤k0 1 )	  of	  the	  contributions	  paid	  
by	  the	   first	  generation	  of	  active	  workers	  and	   ‘donates’	   the	  remaining	  share	   ( -­‐ k1 )	   to	  
first	  generation	  of	  retirees.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  steady	  state	  with	  a	  constant	  age-­‐
distribution	  of	  the	  insured	  population	  will	  also	  be	  assumed.	  
Given	  that	  the	  liabilities	  of	  the	  scheme	  at	  its	  birth	  in	  period	  t	  coincide	  with	  the	  
contributions	   levied	   on	   the	   first	   generation	   of	   active	   workers,	   if	   a	   share	   k 	   of	   this	  
revenue	   is	   saved	   in	   a	   fund,	   the	   scheme’s	   initial	   degree	   of	   funding	   is	   precisely	   equal	  
tok .	  
The	  following	  other	  notations	  are	  adopted:	  
tW :	  Total	  earnings	  of	  the	  active	  members	  in	  period	  t;	  	  
tF :	  Value	  of	  the	  reserve	  fund	  in	  period	  t;	  
tL :	  Liabilities	  in	  period	  t;	  
r :	  Market	  interest	  rate;	  
 !
w :	  Growth	  rate	  of	  total	  earnings;	  
π :	  Conventional	  rate	  of	  return	  credited	  on	  all	  account	  balances;	  
c :	  Contribution	  rate.	  
We	  will	   prove	   that	   the	   rate	  of	   return	   to	  be	   credited	  on	  all	   account	  balances	   for	   the	  





⋅ r + w( ) .	  
Let	  us	  start	  by	  reiterating	  that	  the	  liabilities	  of	  the	  scheme	  in	  period	  t	  are	  
(1)	    !Lt = c ⋅Wt ,	  
whereas	   the	   value	   of	   the	   fund	   in	   the	   same	   period	   is	   a	   share	   k 	   of	   the	   contribution	  







= k .	  
For	   the	   degree	   of	   funding	   to	   be	   equal	   to	   k 	   also	   in	   period	   t+1,	   the	   rate	   of	   return	  






k ⋅c ⋅Wt ⋅ 1+ r( ) + c ⋅Wt ⋅ 1+ w( )− c ⋅Wt ⋅ 1+ π( )
c ⋅Wt ⋅ 1+
w( ) = k ,	  
where	  the	  numerator	  of	  (2)	  expresses	  the	  value	  of	  the	  fund	  in	  t+1	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  
value	  of	  the	  fund	  in	  period	  t	  gross	  of	  the	  interests	  matured	  at	  the	  market	  interest	  rate	  
r,	  and	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  contribution	  revenue	  and	  the	  pension	  expenditure	  
in	  period	  t+1,	  the	  latter	  being	  equal	  to	  the	  contributions	  paid	  in	  period	  t	  gross	  of	  the	  
interests,	   computed	   at	   the	   rate	   π ,	   credited	   on	   the	   account	   balances	   of	   the	   first	  
generation	   of	   active	   workers.	   The	   liabilities	   in	   t+1,	   at	   the	   denominator	   of	   (2),	   are	  
simply	  given	  by	  the	  contributions	  paid	  by	  the	  active	  workers	  in	  period	  t+1,	  the	  previous	  
debt	  having	  been	  fully	  redeemed	  with	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  pensions.	  
Simplifying	  and	  reordering,	  (2)	  becomes:	  
 !
1+ π( )
1+ w( ) =
k ⋅ 1+ r( ) + 1+ w( )




π = 1+ w( ) + k ⋅ 1+ r( )− 1+ w( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −1




1. Condition	  (3)	  applies	  to	  any	  DC	  scheme,	  regardless	  of	  its	  degree	  of	  funding.	  In	  
fact:	   (i)	   for	   k = 0 ,	   i.e.	   for	  pure	  PAYG	   schemes,	   the	   sustainable	   return	   is	   equal	   to	   the	  
growth	  rate	  of	  the	  total	  earnings	  of	  active	  workers;	   (ii)	   for	   k = 1 ,	   i.e.	   for	   fully	   funded	  
schemes,	  the	  sustainable	  rate	  of	  return	  equals	  the	  market	  interest	  rate.	  
2. Choosing	  a	  rate	  of	  return	  equal	  to	  (3)	  implies	  the	  equality	  between	  contribution	  
revenue	   and	   pension	   disbursement	   only	   if	   the	   market	   interest	   rate	   is	   equal	   to	   the	  
growth	  rate	  of	  the	  total	  earnings	  of	  the	  active	  population.	  	  
3. Choosing	  a	  rate	  of	  return	  equal	  to	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  the	  total	  earnings	  of	  the	  
active	  population	  ensures	   in	  any	  case	  the	  equality	  between	  the	  contribution	  revenue	  
and	   the	   pension	   expenditure	   in	   each	   year.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   value	   of	   k	  will	   increase,	  
decrease	  or	  remain	  stationary	  according	  to	  whether	  the	  market	  interest	  rate	  exceeds,	  
falls	  short	  of	  or	  equals	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  the	  total	  earnings	  of	  the	  active	  population.	  
4. In	  reality,	   i.e.	  outside	  the	  steady	  state	  and	  with	  a	  varying	  age-­‐structure	  of	  the	  
population,	  some	  DC	  systems	  use	  their	  reserves	  as	  a	  buffer	  fund	  whose	  value	  goes	  up	  
and	   down	   according	   to	   the	   economic	   and	   demographic	   cycles	   without	   any	  
commitment	  to	  fund	  their	  liabilities	  to	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  extent;	  in	  such	  cases	  a	  sort	  of	  
automatic	  balance	  mechanism	  à	  la	  suédoise	  (3)	  might	  be	  needed	  for	  the	  buffer	  fund	  to	  
remain	  always	  positive.	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